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I. INTRODUCTION
The AT&T antitrust case produced, for a twelve-year period, a world
of two regulators: the AT&T consent decree court (with assistance from the
U.S. Department of Justice) and the FCC. In general, the two authorities
worked in tandem with one another, but the mismatch of tasking a judge
with overseeing an ambitious regulatory regime led Congress to terminate
the AT&T consent decree in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996
Act) and replace it with FCC oversight.' At the same time, however, the
1996 Act left in place a regime of dual merger review. In so doing,
Congress ignored the concerns of the dual regulation in this context. Over
the last twelve years (the same time period that the AT&T consent decree
was in force), the limitations of dual regulation in the merger review
context have become clear and call for reform.
Many calls for reform of merger review in the telecommunications
industry begin with a premise of the 1996 Act: one regulator is enough, and
the reign of the redundant regulator should be ended. To that end, Harold
Furchtgott-Roth, a former FCC Commissioner, has called for an end to
FCC oversight of mergers between telecommunications providers,
developing his critique in a number of his separate statements while he
served on the FCC and in testimony to the U.S. Antitrust Modernization
Commission.2 In so doing, he amplified the criticism offered by a number
of commentators, former FCC officials, and practitioners, all of whom
bemoan the FCC's lack of a clear competition policy standard, penchant for
imposing conditions unrelated to the merger itself, and tendency to delay
the ultimate approval of the transaction.3
Over the last decade, the FCC has vacillated in its approach to merger
review and offered plenty of ammunition to its critics. One constant is that,
except for the very rare case,4 it does not bar two firms from merging on
competition policy grounds. Rather, it generally imposes conditions on the
merger. In the worst of cases, the FCC, as former Chairman Powell once
1. See 47 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
2. See Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth, Testimony Before the Antitrust Modernization
Comm'n (Dec. 5, 2005) (transcript available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/
commission hearings/regulated industries.htm (follow "Harold Furchtgott-Roth"
hyperlink).
3. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow & Peter W. Huber, A Tale of Two Agencies: A
Comparative Analysis of FCC and DOJ Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 2000 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 29 (2000); Donald J. Russell & Sherri Lynn Wolson, Dual Antitrust Review
of Telecommunications Mergers By The Department of Justice and the Federal
Communications Commission, 11 GEO. MASON L. REv. 143 (2002); Bryan Tramont, Too
Much Power, Too Little Restraint: How the FCC Expands Its Reach Through
Unenforceable and Unwieldy "Voluntary Agreements," 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 49 (2000).
4. See Application of EchoStar Comm. Corp., General Motors Corp., & Hughes Elec.
Corp., Hearing Designation Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 20559 (2002).
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criticized, "places harms on one side of a scale and then collects and places
any hodgepodge of conditions-no matter how ill-suited to remedying the
identified infirmities-on the other side of the scale."5 In the best of cases,
the FCC imposes conditions that address competition policy concerns
raised by the merger and enables the Department of Justice's Antitrust
Division (DOJ) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to clear a merger
that would otherwise pose potential objections.
Taking a lesson from the experience with the AT&T consent decree,
the challenge for reforming the existing merger review regime is to design
a system where antitrust authorities play the central role in analyzing a
merger's competitive effects and regulators play the central role in
imposing and enforcing regulatory remedies. At present, the U.S. system
sometimes veers toward a worst case scenario where federal antitrust
authorities-the FTC and DOJ-impose regulatory remedies that overlap
with regulatory policy and regulatory agencies perform duplicative merger
reviews and impose remedies unrelated to the mergers themselves.
Moreover, antitrust merger remedies themselves are often not developed
through a transparent, consistent, or predictable process. In short, there is
compelling need for institutional reform of antitrust merger remedies in
general and in particular with respect to how the FCC oversees mergers
between telecommunications companies.
Part II of this Article explains the practice of the FCC in reviewing
mergers involving regulated firms. Part III discusses the practice of the
DOJ, FTC, and European Union in reviewing mergers of
telecommunications companies. Part IV outlines some directions for
reforming the U.S. system of merger review and merger remedies in the
telecommunications arena. Part V offers a short conclusion.
II. THE VICES AND VIRTUES OF REDUNDANT REGULATORY
MERGER REVIEW
As a technical matter, the FCC does not review mergers qua mergers.
Although the FCC does have authority under the Clayton Act to review
mergers involving regulated firms, it instead relies on its authority to
evaluate whether the acquiring firm should be permitted-under the broad
and ill-defined "public interest" test-to acquire and operate the licenses
held by the to-be-acquired firm. As discussed in subpart A, this
5. Applications of Ameritech Corp., Transferor, & SBC Comm., Inc., Transferee,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 14712, 15197 (1999) (statement of Comm'r
Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6. To be sure, the FCC picks and chooses when to utilize this authority; it does not, for
example, "examine the effect of the merger on taxi service to the public" even though it
"might be required to approve the transfer of control of various radio licenses." Applications
for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations by Time
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unrestrained mandate creates considerable opportunity for mischief.7
Nonetheless, as discussed in subpart B, FCC merger-related actions can
address competition policy concerns raised by a merger and aid the DOJ or
the FTC in overseeing regulatory remedies.
A. The Perils of FCC Merger Review
In questioning the role of regulatory merger review, critics such as
former FCC Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth focus on the unnecessary
delays and costs occasioned by this process. More problematic, however, is
how regulatory merger review invites a process of negotiated "voluntary"
conditions that often substitute for careful policymaking.8 Notably, such
conditions are developed without the benefit of notice and comment, are
often negotiated in haste, and are not subject to judicial review.
Nonetheless, given the FCC's ability to simply withhold approval of a
license transfer-without any time limitation 9-parties understandably
view such conditions as a cost of doing business.
For a case in point, the merger between AOL and Time Warner
demonstrates how FCC merger review invites questionable policy
judgments. In that case, the FCC's decision was suspect in three distinct
ways. First, the agency's authority to review that merger resulted from the
fact that the merger was structured as AOL's acquisition of Time Warner
rather than the other way around. Notably, because AOL did not possess
any licenses granted by the FCC, there would have been no statutory basis
Warner, Inc. and America Online, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R.
6547, para. 146 n.396 (2001) [hereinafter AOL Order]. In principle, however, the FCC
could do just that, as its oversight over all licenses authorizes it to attach to the certificate
"such terms and conditions as in its judgment the public convenience and necessity may
require." 47 U.S.C. § 214(c) (2000).
7. The Commission has attempted to provide some analytical structure for its merger
analysis in a series of orders. See, e.g., Application of Nynex Corp., Transferor, and Bell
Atl. Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 19985, para. 7
(1997); see also Verizon Comm., Inc. and MCI, Inc., Applications for Approval of Transfer
of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18433, para. 19 (2005)
[hereinafter Verizon Order] ("Despite broad authority, the Commission has held that it will
impose conditions only to remedy harms that arise from the transaction (i.e., transaction-
specific harms) and that are related to the Commission's responsibilities under the
Communications Act and related statutes." (citations omitted)). Nonetheless, because its
remedies invariably take the form of a set of "voluntary conditions" that may or may not be
closely tailored to address competitive harms arising from the merger, it is difficult to view
the framework set out in these orders as a real constraint on the Commission's authority.
8. See, e.g., Verizon Order, supra note 7, at 142 (statement of Comm'r Abernathy
criticizing use of merger review-based conditions as opposed to "the customary
administrative weaponry in the Commission's arsenal").
9. The FCC has instituted a self-imposed six month period for merger reviews. See
Ted Heam, Winds of Change, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 28, 2008,
http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6525874.html. Not only is this "shot clock" not
mandatory, it is regularly circumvented by requests that parties "stop the clock." Id.
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for FCC review had Time Warner acquired AOL. Second, the FCC used its
authority over the merger to impose a regulatory mandate unrelated to the
merger itself (imposing an interoperability mandate as to the instant
messaging system previously operated by AOL).10 Finally, the FCC's
cursory judgment on a matter outside its traditional realm of regulation was
highly questionable on the merits' '-a fact the FCC later recognized when
it lifted the condition only two years later.
12
The interoperability mandate imposed by the FCC in the AOL/Time
Warner merger illustrates the tendency of the agency to reach judgments in
haste that are better considered as part of a more deliberate inquiry. In that
case, the FCC conducted a very cursory inquiry, not only of the merits of
its action, but also into the thorny question of whether it possessed
jurisdiction to regulate instant messaging at all. With little analysis of this
question, the FCC concluded that instant messaging and "AOL's [names
and presence database] are subject to our jurisdiction under Title I of the
Communications Act.' 13 As then-Commissioner Powell pointed out in
dissent, it was questionable for the FCC to reach such a judgment in haste,
as "such a grand conclusion should only be reached after very careful and
thoughtful deliberations and full comment by a wide range of interested
parties.,, 14 By divorcing the FCC's analysis from real-world adjudication or
even the need to justify its decisions, this practice has the effect of
deferring the need to address issues properly considered in a broader and
more thorough rulemaking or adjudicatory context.
10. Unlike the DOJ, the FCC does not ask whether there is "a significant nexus between
the proposed transaction, the nature of the competitive harm, and the proposed remedial
provisions." ANTITRUST Div., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIvISION POLICY GUIDE TO
MERGER REMEDIES (2004) [hereinafter POLICY GUIDE], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf.
11. For a critique of this decision, see Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard
Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REv. 822, 842 (2001).
12. See Petition of AOL Time Warner Inc. for Relief From the Condition Restricting
Streaming Video AIHS, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 16835 (2003).
13. AOL Order, supra note 6, at para. 148.
14. The entirety of Powell's response is worth considering:
There may be a case for asserting our jurisdiction over IM services, and then
finding that they must interoperate as a matter of law, though I doubt it. But such a
grand conclusion should only be reached after very careful and thoughtful
deliberations and full comment by a wide range of interested parties, which can
only be achieved in a rulemaking proceeding. The record here and the limited
comment are woefully insufficient for considering and anticipating the
reverberations of our conclusions. This merger, involving only two members of
the industry is not an appropriate vehicle for taking our authority where the
Majority does today.
AOL Order, supra note 6, at 6713 (dissenting statement of Comm'r Powell).
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B. Regulatory Oversight as Complementary to Antitrust
Despite cases like AOL/Time Warner, the FCC can play a
constructive role in merger review in certain cases. For a perfect illustration
of the FCC's use of such authority, consider, for example, its review of the
News Corp./DirecTV merger. In that case, the FCC concluded that the
union of DirecTV and News Corp.'s programming interests (including the
Fox broadcast network, cable channels like FX and Fox News, and regional
sports channels) raised a plausible risk of vertical leveraging whereby
News Corp. would abuse its ownership of those properties so as to
disadvantage rival distributors. 5
To address the competitive concerns raised in the News
Corp./DirecTV merger, the FCC required DirecTV not only to be subject to
a regime similar to the "program access rules,' 16 which govern vertically
integrated cable providers, but also to adhere to additional requirements
related to its control over regional sports channels and local television
stations. 7 As to the imposition of program-access-like rules on the merged
firm, the FCC harmonized them with its program access rules by making
them applicable so long as the program access rules remained in effect and
subjected complaints related to the merger conditions to the same process
used for the program access rules.' 8 As to the rules governing regional
sports networks and local television stations, the FCC developed a special
procedure (i.e., an arbitration regime) to ensure that cable companies
continued to receive reasonable access to such programming.' 9
In acting in the News Corp./DirecTV case, the FCC carefully
coordinated its decision with the DOJ. In the wake of the FCC's action, the
DOJ concluded that "[t]he restrictions imposed by the FCC as a condition
for granting its approval of the transaction will reduce News Corp.'s ability
to withhold, or to threaten to withhold, its programming content from cable
television and [Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS)] providers that currently
compete with DirecTV. 20 Moreover, the DOJ explained that it "consulted
15. General Motors Corp. and Hughes Electronic Corp., Transferors, and News Corp.
Ltd., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 473, para. 4 (2004)
[hereinafter News Corp. Order].
16. The program access rules constitute a protective measure against vertical
leveraging, requiring all cable providers to allow rivals access to program channels on non-
discriminatory terms and conditions. For a discussion of the program access rules, see
JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 369-71 (2005).
17. See News Corp. Order, supra note 15, at paras. 172-79.
18. See id. at paras. 127-32.
19. Seeid. atpara. 177.
20. Press Release, Justice Department Will Not Challenge News Corp.'s Acquisition of
Hughes Electronics Corp. (Dec. 19, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/
December/03_at_714.htm.
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with and provided assistance to the FCC," the FCC action "addresse[d] the
Department's most significant concerns with the proposed transaction," and
the FCC's decision motivated the DOJ's decision to close its
investigation.2'
In the 2005 Verizon/MCI and SBC/AT&T mergers,22 it is difficult to
determine whether the FCC coordinated its review with the DOJ, but it is
clear that many of the conditions imposed by the FCC address issues far
beyond the effects of the merger. In a defensible move possibly intended to
safeguard against competitive concerns related to the Internet backbone,
the FCC required that the Internet backbone affiliates of the two companies
disclose their policies on publicly accessible Web sites.23 As a remedy to
address plausible concerns, a disclosure mandate is a reasonable safeguard
that may well facilitate future antitrust oversight of this market. In a less
antitrust-friendly move, the FCC also adopted the insurance policy of
imposing price freezes as well as nondiscriminatory access requirements in
the affected market of high capacity circuits (called "special access")-
despite suggesting that the DOJ's remedy for competitive concerns in the
relevant market was adequate.24
Among the many conditions the FCC imposed on the Verizon/MCI
and SBC/AT&T mergers, the agency followed its AOL/Time Warner
precedent by addressing a number of matters related more to industry-wide
issues than to the merger itself. In particular, the FCC used the merger as
an opportunity to address an issue pending in an industry-wide rulemaking
by imposing the requirement that the companies provide the so-called
"naked DSL" (i.e., DSL service without providing a telephone line).25 It
also used the merger to take another incremental step toward "network
neutrality" safeguards by mandating that the companies follow the FCC's
Internet Policy Statement.26 In both cases, it is difficult to see how the
public is better served through such ad hoc decisions made in the merger
review context-which leave incumbent providers not involved in mergers
free of the relevant obligations-than through a greater commitment to
21. Id.
22. See Verizon Order, supra note 7; SBC Comm., Inc. and AT&T Corp., Applications
for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18290
(2005) [hereinafter AT&T Order].
23. See AT&T Order, supra note 22, para. 133; Verizon Order, supra note 7, para. 134.
24. See AT&T Order, supra note 22, para. 24; Verizon Order, supra note 7, para. 24.
25. See AT&T Order, supra note 22, para. 211; Verizon Order, supra note 7, para. 221.
26. See AT&T Order, supra note 22, para. 108; Verizon Order, supra note 7, para. 143.
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addressing those issues through industry-wide rulemaking or
adjudication.27
III. THE ANTITRUST AGENCIES' EMERGING STANCE ON
MERGER REMEDIES
The modem era for antitrust merger review in the United States began
in 1976 with the enactment of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act (HSR Act).28 Before the HSR Act, antitrust agencies
often did not learn of mergers until after they were consummated, making it
difficult to remedy an anticompetitive merger where they would be forced
to "unscramble the egg." To address the concern that merger challenges
resulted in only "Pyrrhic victories," 29 the HSR Act requires mergers of a
certain size to be reported to the antitrust agencies and subject to an initial
waiting period before the merger is permitted to close. Not only does the
HSR Act ensure that the antitrust agencies receive notice of an array of
mergers, it also provides them an opportunity to request information before
a merger is allowed to close. In practice, the notification requirement and
limitations on consummating a merger have transformed the process of
merger review, leading companies to increasingly address competition
concerns via consent decrees (or "fix-it-first" arrangements where the
parties sell off duplicative businesses or assets to avoid antitrust
concerns).3"
The transformation of merger control from a litigation-centric model
to a negotiation-centric model represents an unintended consequence of the
HSR Act. In practice, this new model of merger review involves a flexibly
structured negotiation over the scope of acceptable remedies. In this
context, "flexibly structured" means that such negotiations are not subject
to either established procedures or substantive requirements. In many cases,
this negotiation resembles a form of three-dimensional chess, as it may not
only include a regulatory dimension, but an international one as well
(particularly as to the European Union). From 1995 to 2001, for example,
27. See, e.g., Verizon Order, supra note 7, at 142 (statement of Comm'r Abernathy)
("[T]he customary administrative weaponry in the Commission's arsenal-rulemaking,
enforcement, and so on-does not suddenly evaporate once a merger is approved.").
28. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
29. See Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Laws: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L. & ECON.
43 (1969).
30. This change has attracted some criticism. See, e.g., Joe Sims & Michael McFaIls,
Negotiated Merger Remedies: How Well Do They Solve Competition Problems?, 69 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 932, 935-36 (2001).
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fifty of fifty-eight mergers reviewed by both the U.S. antitrust agencies and
the European Union resulted in conditional approvals.3 '
The current system of merger control is still adapting to the HSR Act
model and the jurisprudence on merger remedies remains a work-in-
progress. On the question of whether a merger violates antitrust law,
counsel can consult both case law and the 1992 Merger Guidelines (which
set forth the standards used by the antitrust agencies). As to what merger
remedies are appropriate, there is no authoritative source of guidance and,
in general, the reliance on previously negotiated remedial consent decrees
that are neither explained nor justified creates an unfortunate lack of
transparency.32 To bridge the gap, both the DOJ and the FTC have issued
statements addressing this issue. These pronouncements, however, are not
binding and, at best, explain the agencies' respective practices vis-i-vis
consent decrees and fix-it-first solutions to otherwise anticompetitive
mergers.33 Thus, even more so in the case of merger remedies than in other
areas, "consent decrees have so enriched--or supplanted---case law that the
advice antitrust lawyers give their clients frequently may be entirely
divorced from recent case law authority.
34
With their recent pronouncements, the antitrust agencies are moving
toward a more consistent and transparent framework for evaluating merger
remedies, but they have yet to coalesce on a clearly identified strategy for
evaluating merger remedies in general or cooperating with regulatory
agencies in particular. Highlighting the importance of this issue, former
FTC Chairman Pitofsky concluded that "there is no more important set of
policy questions facing the antitrust community than defining the nature
31. Frangois lv~nque & Howard Shelanski, Introduction, in MERGER REMEDIES IN
AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION LAW, xix-xx (Frangois Lvenque & Howard
Shelanski, eds.) (2003).
32. This failing has not gone unnoticed by the antitrust agencies. "Some believe that
one negative consequence to 'litigation by consent decree' is the lack of global transparency
as compared to litigation in court." Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Gen., Dep't of
Justice, Houston, We Have a Competitive Problem: How Can We Remedy It? (Apr. 17,
2002) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/11112.pdf).
33. The DOJ published an Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies and the
FCC issued a set of best practices on merger remedies. See PoLICY GUIDE, supra note 10;
see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENT OF THE FED. TRADE COMM'N BUREAU OF
COMPETITION ON NEGOTIATING MERGER REMEDiES (2003), available at
http://www.fte.gov/bc/bestpractices/bestpractices030401.htm.
34. Michael L. Weiner, Antitrust and the Rise of the Regulatory Consent Decree, 10
ANTITRUST 4, 4 (1995). Part of the reason for the divorce between case law and practice is
that "it appears that defendants commonly enter into consent decrees where the alleged
violation is uncertain and the costs of the consent decree remedy are likely to be less than
the costs of even a successful defense in litigation." A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust: The
New Regulation, 10 ANTITRUST 13, 13-14 (1995).
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and limits of appropriate restructuring in merger review. 35 The importance
of this issue is two-fold. First, as Pitofsky explains, a theoretically clean
divestiture of the overlap can still result in a consumer welfare loss if the
acquirer is unable to provide the same level of pre-merger competition.36
Second, the toolkit for merger remedies is notably different from evaluating
the competitive effects of mergers and, until recently, the choice of
remedial strategies has received very little academic (or judicial) attention.
A. Conduct Remedies Imposed Pursuant to Merger Review
In general, antitrust agencies eschew the administration of conduct
remedies as a perilous exercise. As the DOJ's Policy Guide explains,
"[s]tructural remedies are preferred to conduct remedies in merger cases
because they are relatively clean and certain, and generally avoid costly
government entanglement in the market." 37 To be more precise, in cases
involving direct horizontal overlap between the two merging firms, the
antitrust agencies are extraordinarily skeptical that any form of behavioral
remedy will be appropriate, whereas cases involving vertical concerns are
viewed as more amenable to such relief.3
8
35. Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, The Nature and Limits of
Restructuring in Merger Review (Feb. 17, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/pitofsky/restruct.htm).
36. As former Chairman Pitofsky explained, "[e]xperience shows that even when
companies invest substantial resources and therefore have incentives to succeed, they may
not successfully replace the eliminated firm." Id. From the standpoint of merger law, such
results constitute policy failures, as the Supreme Court calls for remedies "effective to
redress the violations" and "restore competition." Ford Motor Corp. v. United States, 405
U.S. 562, 575 (1972) (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S.
316, 326 (1961)). In so doing, the agencies enjoy wide discretion to accomplish this goal,
including requiring the divestiture of non-overlapping assets. See Olin Corp. v. Fed. Trade
Comm'n, 986 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 110 (1994); see also Jacob
Siegel Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 327 U.S. 608, 611 (1946) (noting the FTC's "wide
discretion in its choice of a remedy" to address antitrust violation).
37. POLICY GUIDE, supra note 10, at 7, 8. The Supreme Court's longer discussion of the
point bears notice as well:
Of the very few litigated [merger] cases which have been reported, most decreed
divestiture as a matter of course. Divestiture has been called the most important of
antitrust remedies. It is simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure. It should
always be in the forefront of a court's mind when a violation of [Section 7 of the
Clayton Act] has been found.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 366 U.S. at 329-31 (citations omitted).
38. Skepticism is not the same as a complete bar. For starters, it is an established
practice for the antitrust agencies to impose some form of ongoing conduct remedies to
supplement structural relief. Moreover, there are cases where the agencies will conclude that
the mandated conduct remedies will address a horizontal concern. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris
Indus., 59 Fed. Reg. 64,701, 64,709 (Dep't of Justice, Dec. 15, 1994) (proposed final
judgment) (explaining that "divestiture was not necessary in the Baltimore market and that a
change in the types of contracts used" was deemed sufficient to address any competitive
concerns).
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A quintessential form of regulatory relief often proposed to address
horizontal overlap is price regulation, particularly when the firms claim that
the loss of competition will only be temporary. Despite some support from
state Attorneys General (who also possess authority to enforce both federal
and state antitrust laws), the federal antitrust agencies have consistently
rejected such measures as insufficient to justify approval of an otherwise
anticompetitive merger.39 As the DOJ's Policy Guide notes, regulatory
guarantees as to price are notoriously unreliable, hard to enforce, and may
lead a firm "profitably, and inefficiently, to reduce its costs by cutting back
on quality-thereby effecting an anticompetitive increase in the 'quality
adjusted' price.'40 Moreover, for declining cost industries, a price freeze
may actually allow for higher prices than would otherwise be obtained
absent the merger. Finally, pricing flexibility-such as that necessary to
facilitate pro-consumer price discrimination (i.e., offering discounts to
certain customers who would not otherwise purchase the product)--can
benefit consumers in some cases, meaning that restrictive regulations may
actually undermine consumer welfare.4'
In the telecommunications arena, Echostar tested the DOJ's
skepticism of price regulation in 2002 by committing to nationwide pricing
in the event that the DOJ approved its merger with DirecTV.42 In that case,
the DOJ brought suit nonetheless, reflecting its concern that any such
commitment would be difficult to enforce and would restrict the operation
of market forces-i.e., cutting rates in response to competition is pro-
competitive and such a regime would (at least in some cases) deter such
strategies. In so doing, the DOJ highlighted its reluctance to superintend
such relief and its awareness that, in any event, unintended consequences
might well render such measures anticompetitive.
39. See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F.Supp. 121, 135 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (challenge to merger in the face of a price freeze agreed to by state Attorney General);
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1298 (W.D. Mich.
1996) (FTC motion for preliminary injunction in face of "Community Commitment" that
included price freeze). See also Mary Lou Steptoe & David Balto, Finding The Right
Prescription: The FTC's Use of Innovative Merger Remedies, 10 ANTITRUST 16, 20 (1995)
("The FTC has consistently rejected [price regulation proposals] on the grounds that it is not
a price-regulatory agency, compliance is difficult to monitor, and competition is the proper
driving force for pricing decisions.").
40. POLICY GUIDE, supra note 10, at 8.
41. POLICY GUIDE, supra note 10, at 8-9.
42. See Jennifer Beauprez & Anne Mulkem, Justice Dept. Sues to Bar EchoStar
Merger, 23 States Join In, Dooming DirecTV Deal, DENVER PosT, Nov. 1, 2002, at Cl.
Technically speaking, Echostar-and later, News Corp.-proposed transactions with
Hughes Corp. Because of the competitive issues which arose from Hughes Corp.'s
ownership of DirecTV, this essay discusses the merger as one between Echostar (and later,
News Corp.) and DirecTV.
Number 1 ]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
The antitrust agencies' preference for structural remedies reflects, in
significant part, the legacy of the AT&T consent decree. That legacy
underscores that such ongoing supervision presents a challenge to antitrust
authorities because, as Judge Posner explained, "the enforcement agencies
and the courts do not have adequate technical resources, and do not move
fast enough, to cope effectively with a very complex business sector that
changes very rapidly. ' '43 Notably, the AT&T consent decree provides
support for this proposition, living up to Judge Greene's fear that "in the
end, a judicially-created bureaucracy would [not] be any more capable than
the FCC itself of performing the unending task of vigilance and oversight"
necessary to regulate incumbent monopolies. 44
In entering the AT&T consent decree, Judge Greene believed he
avoided the fate of regulation-through-antitrust by rejecting the option of a
detailed regulatory decree, noting that "courts have generally rejected this
type of detailed injunction in favor of the 'surer, cleaner remedy of
divestiture.' '45 Judge Greene failed to anticipate, however, that the AT&T
consent decree's provision for waivers from the line-of-business
restrictions that accompanied the mandated divestiture would create an
ongoing set of messy questions for him to address (with the aid of the
DOJ's Antitrust Division).46 In other cases of judicial management of
complex access arrangements, notably New Zealand's effort to ensure
reliable cooperation between incumbents and new entrants on matters such
as interconnection arrangements, courts were on their own and the effort at
regulation by antitrust failed miserably.47 In the context of merger review,
the challenges of devising an appropriate conduct remedy are even greater
because not only does the antitrust agency lack the industry experience of
an industry-specific regulator, but it also must act under severe time
43. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 925
(2001).
44. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 168 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
45. Id. at n.155 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316,
334 (1961)).
46. One commentator has defended this system. See Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall
of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act: Regulation of Telecommunications Under
Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395 (1999). However, many have criticized it on the
ground that "[g]etting answers to simple questions often took months or even years." John
Thorne, Testimony to the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n (Dec. 5, 2005) (transcript
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commissionhearings/pdf/StatementThome
.pdf).
47. See Mary Newcomer Williams, Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications
Regulation: Pifalls and Opportunities, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 269, 277 (2003); see also JEAN-
JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 34 (2000) (the
New Zealand case demonstrates the "difficulty of ensuring competition in the absence of
regulation").
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constraints.48 In short, the AT&T case represents an exceptional remedial
strategy, as "[c]ourts are, by definition, not the expert regulators that these
kinds of degrees really call for."49
In cases of vertical mergers involving issues of access to
complementary resources, the antitrust agencies are far more willing to
entertain regulatory-type remedies. Because vertical mergers often create
substantial efficiencies,50 along with possible competitive concerns, they
are far more likely than horizontal ones to fall into the class of cases where
"a full-stop prohibition of the merger would sacrifice significant
efficiencies and a structural remedy would also sacrifice such efficiencies
or is infeasible." 5' Moreover, the DOJ pursues such relief "almost always
in industries where there already is close government oversight," such as
the telecommunications industry. 2
When the DOJ imposes a behavioral requirement to address concerns
about vertical relations, it often replicates or anticipates efforts taken by the
FCC. A notable case in point-and a starkly different strategy than that
used in the News Corp./DirecTV matter-is the DOJ's consent decree
imposed in the Primestar case. In that case, the DOJ concluded that the
Primestar joint venture (which consisted of a number of cable companies
who operated a direct-to-home satellite service) sought "to raise barriers to
entry by other firms into [direct broadcast satellite] by, among other things,
restraining the availability, or the terms and conditions of availability, of
partner-controlled or owned programming to possible entrants" in the
multi-channel video programming distribution market.5 3 Rather than
require a divestiture of the satellite service, the DOJ negotiated a highly
regulatory consent decree that included a bar on exclusive access to
48. See Patrick Rey, Economic Analysis and Choice of Remedies, in MERGER
REMEDIES, supra note 31, at 129, 131.
49. Diane P. Wood, A Comparison of Merger Review and Remedy Procedures in the
United States and the European Union, in MERGER REMEDIES, supra note 31, at 67, 70. In
Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 415 (2004), the Court concluded that compulsory access
requirements should be deeded irremediable when granting them would "requiref] the court
to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory agency" (quoting Phillip
Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANrITRUST L.J.
841, 853 (1989)).
50. For a discussion of efficiencies resulting from vertical integration, see Joseph
Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies:
Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARv. J.L.
TECH. 85, 97-106 (2003).
51. POLICY GuiDE, supra note 10, at 18.
52. Id. at 20.
53. Primestar Partners, L.P., 58 Fed. Reg. 33,944, 33,948 (Dep't of Justice June 22,
1993) (proposed final judgment).
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programming unless a rival DBS firm obtained a similar exclusive program
offering. 
4
The DOJ's action in the Primestar case highlights the perils of
imposing regulatory requirements as part of merger approvals. In the
Primestar case, the DOJ instituted a regime related to the "program access
rules" superintended by the FCC-a fact noted by the DOJ55-but made no
effort to ensure that its regime did not duplicate the FCC requirement that
cable providers make available access to their affiliated programming.
56
Similarly, in the TCI/Liberty matter, the DOJ imposed a particularly
questionable mandate that the merged firm not engage in discriminatory
practices related to the sale of video programming so as to "unreasonably []
restrain competition."57 Whether that concept merely mirrored the antitrust
laws or some approximation of the FCC's program access rules, it was
questionable of the DOJ to condition a merger on an ill-defined
requirement that would be difficult for it to enforce.
Like the DOJ, the FTC is willing to mandate access arrangements that
require regulatory oversight to address vertical concerns. First, in its review
of Time Warner's merger with Turner Broadcasting, the FTC imposed a
requirement that all Time Warner cable systems carry an alternative news
channel to CNN.58 In so doing, the FTC instituted a protective measure
against foreclosure of program channels not affiliated with cable systems. 59
Second, in the AOL/Time Warner merger, the FTC mandated access to
Time Warner's broadband access service for independent Internet service
providers, appointing a special monitor to evaluate any complaints that
Time Warner had breached the relevant requirements. 60 Notably, at the
54. In particular, this exception provided that "if a competing DBS venture obtains any
exclusive programming, Primestar may, upon sixty (60) days prior written notice to the
Department, obtain a reasonably comparable amount of programming of a reasonably
comparable type and quality on a reasonably comparable exclusive basis." Primestar
Partners, L.P., 58 Fed. Reg. at 33,947.
55. The DOJ explained, in its Competitive Impact Statement, that the program access
rules "are intended to prevent unreasonable restrictions on access to programming."
Primestar Partners, L.P., 58 Fed. Reg. at 33,950.
56. For a discussion of the program access rules, see NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra
note 16, at 369-71.
57. Tele-Communications, Inc. & Liberty Media, 59 Fed. Reg. 24,723, 24,727 (Dep't
of Justice May 12, 1994) (competitive impact statement).
58. Time Warner, Inc., File No. 961-0064 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Sept. 12, 1996)
(agreement containing consent order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1996/09/
twconsnt.pdf.
59. In particular, the FCC has-in recent years-restricted the number of affiliated
channels that a cable providers can have as well as the total percentage of cable homes that a
single provider can serve. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 16, at 375-78.
60. Am. Online, Inc., File No. 001 0105 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Dec. 14, 2000) (decision
and order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aoldando.pdf.
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time it did so, the FCC was superintending just this type of requirement for
local telephone companies' broadband operations and was in the process of
concluding that these access obligations did more harm than good.6'
B. Structural Remedies Revisited
The antitrust agencies' strong preference for divestiture remedies can
backfire both in that some divestiture remedies prove anything but clean
and some conduct remedies-particularly if policed by an industry-specific
regulator-can be enforced in a relatively effective manner. In the late
1990s, antitrust authorities increasingly realized the potential limitations of
divestiture remedies, particularly when they were crafted with relatively
little analysis. From an economic perspective (particularly new institutional
economics), the difficulties in ensuring effective divestitures come as no
surprise.62 After all, new institutional economics explains that firms engage
in strategic behavior designed to maximize their profits (often called "ex
post opportunism") unless contractual or structural arrangements deter
them from doing so. 6
3
To appreciate the limits of divestiture remedies, consider the
divestiture of InternetMCI (as part of the approval of the MCI/Worldcom
merger). In that case, the divestiture did not involve any ongoing oversight,
apparently on the theory that failures to live up to contractual commitments
are matters for courts competent to hear breaches of contract claims. In
practice, however, MCI/Worldcom demonstrated little interest in living up
to such commitments, apparently viewing any contract law liability as an
acceptable cost of doing business and undermining a competitor.64
Like the MCI/Worldcom case, the DOJ's approval of the merger of
AT&T and SBC and the merger of MCI and Verizon underscores why a
divestiture remedy may appear simpler in theory than in practice. In those
cases, the DOJ imposed a requirement that the merged firm divest an
61. For a discussion of the FCC's policy on providing ISPs with "open access" to
broadband platforms, see NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 16, at 159-68.
62. Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18
J.L., EcoN. & ORG. 95, 114 (2002) ("It seems to me that divestiture remedies should be used
very cautiously and only in conjunction with careful analysis reflecting [transaction cost
economics] considerations.").
63. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support
Exchanges, 73 AM. EcoN. REv. 519, 519-20 (1983).
64. For a discussion of the nature of the divestiture requirement, see Application of
Worldcom, Inc., and the MCI Comm. Corp. for Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 18025, paras. 151-56 (Sept. 14, 1998). For a discussion of the
failings with regard to the divestiture, see Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake:
Connecting Internet Backbones, (FCC, Working Paper No. 32, 2000); Mergers in the
Telecommunications Industry: Hearing Before The Commission On Commerce, Science &
Transportation, 107th Cong. 55-57 (1999) (statement of Mike McTighe, CEO, Cable &
Wireless) (transcript available at http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/106s/77325.txt).
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indefeasible right of use (IRU) to lateral connections to major office
buildings as well as for certain transport facilities. In explaining the
necessity for such relief, the DOJ explained that "[f]or hundreds of
commercial buildings located in the metropolitan areas of [several major
east coast cities], Verizon and MCI are the only two firms that own or
control a direct wireline connection to the building,"6 5 meaning that, for a
substantial set of customers, the Verizon/MCI and SBC/AT&T deals
constituted a merger to monopoly.66 The DOJ added that those customers
could not expect new entry in the foreseeable future, as "such entry is a
difficult, time-consuming, and expensive process.6 7 In its Competitive
Impact Statement, the DOJ did not evaluate whether simply divesting these
assets-which were not divested along with the associated customers (or
revenue)--would be effective in practice. Based on its Policy Guide,
however, it presumably was "persuaded that these assets will create a
viable entity that will restore competition.
'
,
68
In light of the DOJ's stated preference for divesting existing lines of
business as well as the failure of the InternetMCI divestiture, its choice of
remedy in the Verizon/MCI and SBC/AT&T cases is difficult to
understand. 69 The DOJ might well have eschewed divesting the existing
businesses in areas where Verizon and SBC competed against AT&T and
MCI because customers prefer a single provider for all nationwide
accounts, as opposed to being served by the merged firm in areas without
any overlap and by a different firm in the incumbent's service territory.
Nonetheless, by taking the additional step of separating the facilities from
the associated traffic and revenue (as opposed to merely the customer
relationship), the DOJ greatly lessened the likelihood of preserving an
alternate provider. In particular, the market moved from one where an
65. United States v. Verizon Comm., Inc., Competitive Impact Statement, Civ. Action
No. 1:05CV02103, at 7 (2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f213000/21
3028.htm.
66. Other governmental analyses of the merger concurred with this judgment. See N.Y.
Dep't of Pub. Sev. Staff White Paper, Proposed Mergers Regarding Verizon N.Y. Inc. and
MCI, Inc., Case 05-C-0237- (N.Y. Dep't of Pub. Serv. July 6, 2005), available at
http://www3.dps.state.ny.us/pscweb/webfileroom.nsf/Web/ (hyperlink "new search", then
search by case number) ("Staff tentatively concludes that the merger [between Verizon and
MCI] could affect business customers by potentially increasing TI prices, and/or cause
deterioration of retail service quality.").
67. Verizon Comm., Inc., Competitive Impact Statement, at 8.
68. PoLicY GUIDE, supra note 10, at 13.
69. The recent European Commission report on merger remedies provides even further
basis for concern, as it concluded that, of the seven mergers studied in which less than the
overlap was divested, five of the divestitures were deemed to be of doubtful effectiveness.
EUROPEAN COMM'N DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR COMPETITION, MERGER REMEDIES STUDY
38 (2005) [hereinafter MERGER REMEDIES STUDY], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
competition/mergers/others/remedies study.pdf.
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alternative provider existed to one where it was possible that such a
provider would emerge. Put differently, AT&T and MCI had constituted
effective competitors against the incumbent providers (SBC and Verizon)
before the merger, but it was far from clear that the firms that purchased the
divested assets would emerge as effective competitors after the merger.
Because the DOJ's Competitive Impact Statement only explained its
theory of liability, and not of remedy, it is unclear how the DOJ justified its
remedial strategy in this case. Notably, it is far from clear why the DOJ
apparently sanctioned the generally unacceptable scenario where a merger
decreases the number of providers from three to two (which went
unremedied).70 Finally, the DOJ's action did not explain an apparent
contradiction with its stance as to the proper remedy in the earlier (and
never consummated) Qwest/Allegiance merger, where it reportedly called
for Qwest to sell off all Allegiance facilities and customers within the
Qwest territory.7'
Not only does the remedy in the Verizon/MCI and SBC/AT&T cases
appear to mean less competition than the status quo ante, but even its
promise of facilitating an alternate provider may well be a Pyrrhic one.
Notably, the DOJ may have underestimated the challenges associated with
managing the terms of dealing between an incumbent and a new entrant. In
particular, the DOJ called for "commercially reasonable IRUs" to be
negotiated so as to enable entrants to have "the cost structure necessary to
be effective., 72 In the event that the merged firm did not identify firms
willing to contract for access to the IRUs, the DOJ would have selected a
trustee to "promptly locate and divest [the IRUs] to an acceptable
purchaser. ' '73 But this trustee was not empowered to oversee any breaches
of obligations connected with the commercially reasonable arrangements,74
raising the question of whether Verizon and SBC will undertake strategies
70. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715-17, 724-25 (D.C.C.
2001) (merger to duopoly held presumptively unlawful); see also William J. Baer, Deborah
L. Feinstein & Randal M. Shaheen, Taking Stock: Recent Trends in U.S. Merger
Enforcement, 18 ANTITRUST 15 (2004) (transactions that reduce significant competitors
from four to three tend to trigger enforcement action).
71. See Qwest Comm. Corp. Comments on Dep't of Pub. Serv. Staff White Paper at 19-
20, Joint Petition of Verizon N.Y., Inc. and MCI, Inc., Case No. 05-C-0237- (rel. Aug. 5,
2005) (recounting Department request), available at http://www.dps.state.ny.us/Quest_
Comment onNYDPSWhitePaper.pdf.
72. Proposed Final Judgment by the United States, United States v. Verizon Comm.,
Inc. & MCI, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:05CV02103 (Oct. 27, 2005).
73. Id.
74. In general, the DOJ eschews the appointment of a monitoring trustee, reserving it
for the "relatively rare situations where a monitoring trustee with technical expertise
unavailable to the Division could perform a valuable role." PoLicY GUIDE, supra note 10, at
40. Similarly, the DOJ recognized that the use of Special Masters is also disfavored for such
situations. Id. at 43 n.58.
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similar to that of MCI Worldcom in the wake of the InternetMCI
divestiture.
In short, any time an antitrust agency requires divesture of assets that
are not already part of an ongoing line of business (sometimes called a
"clean sweep"), it takes a risk that the buyer will fail to compensate for the
loss of competition caused by the merger. As new institutional economics
explains, the merged firm will act strategically and, in the absence of off-
setting incentives, can be expected to undermine the success of its rival
firm. Famously, Oliver Williamson emphasized that, in scenarios where
one firm is potentially at the mercy of another, strategies such as "hostage
taking" may be necessary to ensure effective ongoing cooperation.75 As
suggested by the InternetMCI divestiture as well as, perhaps, the
Verizon/MCI and SBC/AT&T IRU arrangements, the DOJ appears to take
a skeptical stance that such strategic behavior is either possible, likely, or
difficult to address after the fact.76 Alternatively, the DOJ might simply
have concluded that the measures necessary to address the relevant
competitive risks were themselves problematic and not justified.77
75. Williamson, supra note 63, at 519-20.
76. One notable strategy is a "crown jewel" provision. Such a provision generally
requires that if certain assets that must be divested as part of a merger cannot be sold to a
viable purchaser within a certain time frame, then more valuable assets will be added to
sweeten the divestiture package for prospective purchasers. See POLICY GUIDE, supra note
10, at 36-37. While the FTC utilizes such provisions, the DOJ frowns upon them. In its
Policy Guide, the DOJ deems "crown jewel" provisions punitive and indicates its concern
about a different form of strategic behavior-i.e., that purchasers will intentionally delay
negotiation for access to the divested assets so as to gain access to the crown jewel. Id. at
37-38.
77. Yet another possibility is that the DOJ believes that the risks of strategic behavior
are simply less substantial than the relevant competitive benefits of the merger (including
merger-specific efficiencies). For an argument that antitrust agencies should consider this
claim more seriously, see Sims & McFalls, supra note 30, at 947 ("When the overall deal is
large relative to the divestiture package, and when the deal is likely to produce significant
cost savings, the parties and consumers lose significant benefits simply to give the agencies
some marginal assurance that divestitures will be implemented quickly."). In the
MCIlVerizon case, this explanation is certainly plausible, as the DOJ's antitrust chief
explained in its press release that, except for the few required IRU divestitures, "the
Division concluded that the transactions will not harm competition and will likely benefit
consumers, due to existing competition, emerging technologies, the changing regulatory
environment, and exceptionally large merger-specific efficiencies." Press Release,
Department of Justice, Justice Department Requires Divestitures in Verizon's Acquisition of
MCI and SBC's Acquisition of AT&T (Oct. 27, 2005) (quoting Thomas 0. Barnett, Acting
Assistant Att'y Gen.), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2005/
212407.htm. Nonetheless, if the DOJ concluded either that the efficiencies or weaknesses of
the acquired firms justified the merger, that conclusion would certainly be controversial.
United States v. Franklin Elec. Co. Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1035 (W.D. Wis. 2000) ("It
would be odd if a merger of the kind at issue, from two producers to one, could be justified
by either the efficiencies it would generate or because the company to be acquired is
failing.").
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In contrast to the DOJ, the FTC takes a more concerned stance toward
strategic behavior, generally insisting on divestiture of an ongoing
business, an up-front purchaser of the divested assets and, where
appropriate, a "crown jewel provision" (designed to ensure an effective
divestiture).78 This strategy emerges from the FTC divestiture study that
highlighted several recommendations for future merger remedies.79 In
particular, the study suggested a norm of "[u]p-front buyers, requirements
for 'as is' divestitures of ongoing businesses, and contingent divestitures of
'crown jewel' assets for failing to meet the agency's timetable."' This
norm follows the study's conclusion that "divestiture of an on-going
business is more likely to result in viable operation than divestiture of a
more narrowly defined package of assets and provides support for the
common sense conclusion that the Commission should prefer the
divestiture of an on-going business.' Similarly, as to the use of crown
jewel provisions, former FTC Bureau of Competition Director William J.
Baer explained that they "may be particularly valuable when there are some
uncertainties about the salability or viability of the divestiture package, or
where the [merged firm] may be able to frustrate the viability of a
divestiture.
'
"
8 2
Like its use of divested IRUs in the Verizon/MCI and SBC/AT&T
merger cases, the DOJ sometimes uses compulsory licenses to ensure
continued competition after the merger. In the 3D/DTM case, for example,
the DOJ mandated compulsory licensing to critical technology that, once
licensed by a foreign firm with a demonstrated ability to compete in the
market for developing prototypes, would ensure a continued presence of
three major firms in the market.83 Such technology licensing arrangements
78. See Platt Majoras, supra note 32 (comparing Antitrust Division's stance on up-front
buyers to FTC's and explaining approach).
79. See STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION OF THE FED. TRADE COMM'N, A STUDY
OF THE COMMISSION'S DIVESTITURE PROCESS (1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/1999/9908/divestiture.pdf.
80. William J. Baer & Ronald C. Redcay, Solving Competition Problems in Merger
Control: The Requirements for an Effective Remedy, in MERGER REMEDIES, supra note 31,
at 48.
81. STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION OF THE FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 79,
at 12.
82. William J. Baer, Director, Bureau of Competition for the Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Reflections on 20 Years of Merger Enforcement Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (Oct. 29,
1996) (prepared remarks available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/hsrspeec.htm) (the
DOJ strongly disfavors crown jewel provisions).
83. See Platt Majoras, supra note 32, at 9 ("In [the 3D/DTM merger], the Division
chose to require the non-exclusive licensing of technology, .. . [because] the competitors
were just a license away."); Competitive Impact Statement of Plaintiff, United States v. 3D
System Corp. & DTM Corp., Civil No: 1:01CV01237(GK) (Sept. 4, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9000/9019.pdf.
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(presumably like IRUs) will not always be sufficient to justify approval.
Consider, for example, that the DOJ concluded (and was upheld in United
States v. Franklin Electric Co. 84) that such an arrangement was inadequate
because neither of the two suggested licensees had experience in the
relevant market.
The lack of transparency as to merger remedies leaves a series of
unanswered questions. Without more explanation, it is extremely difficult
to discern where the line is between confidence that a viable purchaser can
be found (Verizon/MCI and 3D/DTM) or not (Franklin Electric).
Similarly, it is also difficult to judge the basis for the DOJ's confidence that
its remedies will work effectively without an insistence on an up-front
buyer or special back-end oversight measure. Particularly, in light of the
failure of the InternetMCI spinoff, it is critical that the DOJ be sensitive to
the margin for error inherent in remedies such as the IRU arrangement
called for in Verizon/MCI and the licensing mandate called for in
3D/DTM.
In defense of U.S. antitrust enforcers, there may be reasons for their
reluctance to allow greater transparency. In particular, they may worry
about criticisms leveled at their European counterparts related to focusing
on the interests of individual competitors as opposed to the competitive
process more generally. Moreover, transparency requirements can, if taken
too far, limit constructive discussions, valuable deliberation, and
expeditious decision making. Nonetheless, the lack of disclosure as to their
remedial actions is difficult to defend because, as Justice Brandeis
famously wrote, "[s]unlight is [] the best of disinfectants" and gives rise to
a more understandable process and more predictable results. 5
C. European Union Stance on Antitrust Remedies
The European Union's charter charges its European Commission
(and, in particular, the Directorate General for Competition) with analyzing
mergers (which it defines as "concentrations") to determine if they are
"compatible with the common market." 86 A merger is incompatible if it
"creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective
84. 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1032-33 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
85. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1913). As former Director Baer of the FTC Bureau of Competition stated recently,
"[a]gencies enhance understanding of the process and foster better antitrust risk assessment
by companies when they explain why they decided to act or not to act. Transparency
matters. Critical review of agency performance and of outcomes is not possible without
access to information." William J. Baer, Testimony Before the Antitrust Modernization
Comm'n on U.S. Merger Enforcement Policy 12-13 (Nov. 17, 2005) (statement available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commissionhearings/pdf/BaerStatement_.pdf).
86. European Union Council Reg. No. 139/2004, On The Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, para. 21 (EC).
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competition.., would be significantly impeded. 87 In terms of substantive
standards, the European Commission analyzes mergers in a similar fashion
to the U.S. antitrust agencies, although the EU's concern with
"conglomerate effects," among other factors, contributes to some notably
different conclusions, such as those highlighted by the different results in
the GE/Honeywell merger.88 In terms of procedure, the EU system differs
dramatically from the U.S. model in that the European Commission can bar
a merger without judicial involvement. In contrast to the U.S. model, where
the antitrust agencies must go to court to enjoin a merger, the EU model
calls for judicial review--by the Court of First Instance--only after the
European Commission decides whether to bar the merger.89
The European Commission conducts its merger review process in two
phases. Phase I is the preliminary inquiry, where after receiving all relevant
documents, the agency will consider whether there are "serious doubts"
about the merger's competitive impact. During this phase, or even pre-
notification, the European Commission will consider proposed remedies to
address competitive harms.90 In principle, the Phase II process is a three-
month review of the competitive issues raised by the merger that
culminates-in the event the European Commission identifies concerns
with the merger-in a statement of objections. To provide parties with
more insight into the process, the European Commission has developed a
set of best practices, which call for meetings at key points in the process, at
which parties are free to suggest "undertakings" to make their
concentration compatible with the common market.
Like the U.S. antitrust agencies, the European Commission
historically did not focus carefully on the selection of merger remedies. In
2001, influenced by the FTC Divestiture Study, the European Commission
presented a Notice on Remedies that set forth a similar caution toward
certain divestiture remedies.9' In so doing, the European Commission
87. Id. at para. 24.
88. See Pinar Karacan, Differences in Merger Analysis Between the United States and
the European Union, Highlighted in the Context of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and
GE/Honeywell Mergers, 17 TRANSNAT'L LAW 209 (2004).
89. For a discussion of the EU's procedural framework and its impact on merger
review, see Eric S. Hochstadt, The Brown Shoe of European Union Competition Law, 24
CARDozo L. REV. 287, 297-301 (2002).
90. Id. at 298.
91. Euopean Union Comm'n Notice on Remedies Acceptable Under Council Reg. No.
4064/89 and Under Comm'n Reg. No. 447/98, 2001 O.J. (C 68) para. 13, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/200 I/c_068/c_06820010302en00030011 .pdf; Mario
Monti, European Comm'r for Competition Policy, The Commission Notice on Merger
Remedies-One Year After, at 2 (Jan. 18, 2002) (transcript available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/setLanguage.do?language=en (search "18/01/2002", then follow
"Speech by Mario Monti" hyperlink)). See also Gencor Ltd. v. Comm'n, Case T-102/96
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called for: increased use of up-front buyers, broader divestiture
requirements to ensure a viable operation post-merger, a willingness to use
crown jewel provisions, and a strict commitment to hold separate orders.92
Like the U.S. antitrust agencies, the European Commission does not rule
out conduct remedies, concluding that "whether such commitments can be
accepted has to be determined on a case-by-case basis., 93 Finally, the
European Commission has recognized the black box nature of merger
remedies decisions and has sought-like its U.S. counterparts-to
"enhance transparency about [its] remedies' policy,"94 not only by issuing a
Notice on Remedies, but also best practice guidelines. 95
The European Commission, more so than its American counterparts,
is comfortable mandating regulatory remedies. Notably, even for mergers
that create efficiencies-such as the Vodafone AirTouch/Mannesmann
merger that enabled the merged firm to provide greater roaming
capability-the European Commission took the position that the firm's
unique ability to provide such roaming could create a competitive concern.
To remedy that concern, the European Commission approved the merger
on the condition that the merged firm provide its competitors access to its
network for three years so that they could compete on equal footing.96 This
remedy not only stoked fears that the European Commission is overly
influenced by competitor complaints,97 but that it is insufficiently
appreciative of efficiencies borne of innovation and the possibility that its
ruling would deter innovative conduct in the future.98 Notably, it is clear
(Mar. 25, 1999), available at http://www.curia.eu.int/en/actu/activites/act99/9909en.htm
(follow "T- 102/96" hyperlink).
92. See Antoine Winckler, Some Comments on Procedure and Remedies under EC
Merger Control Rules: Something Rotten in the Kingdom of Merger Control?, in MERGER
REMEDIES, supra note 31, at 75, 82-85 (Frangois Lvenque & Howard Shelanski, eds.)
(2003).
93. Commission Notice on Remedies, supra note 91, at para. 9.
94. Monti, supra note 91, at 4.
95. European Comm'n, Best Practice Guidelines: The Commission's Model Texts for
Divestiture Commitments and the Trustee Mandate Under the EC Merger Regulation para. 6
(May 2, 2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/comnim/competition/
mergers/liegislation/explanatorynote.pdf.
96. Vodafone Airtouch/Mannesman, Case No. COMP/M. 1795 (Dec. 4, 2000),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/ml 795_en.pdf.
97. As one commentator noted:
[Tihere is a growing sense among practitioners that because of the huge
administrative burden that is placed upon the [Merger Task Force] staff, the
insufficient time allowed to test the arguments fully, and the (well-meant) open-
door policy towards complainants, the Commission is sometimes led to rely
significantly on comments of, or inspired by, competitors.
Winckler, supra note 92, at 87.
98. In criticizing the Vodafone/Mannesmann merger, two commentators remarked that:
This is a worrying precedent as it can reduce the incentive to invest or innovate
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that complaints by competitors are taken seriously in the EU process
because, unlike the United States, the EU relies on a process of "market
testing," whereby proposed remedies are evaluated by competitors (as well
as customers and suppliers).
For both the EU and U.S. antitrust agencies, the recent study on
merger remedies conducted by the European Commission suggests the
importance of reconsidering the use of conduct remedies. Of the four
conduct remedies providing access to infrastructure that were analyzed in
the study, three of them were judged unnecessary. 99 Although the study
does not identify particular companies, it seems highly likely that the
Vodafone AirTouch/Mannesmann merger remedy is one of the three
unnecessary remedies, as shortly after that merger, France Telecom and
Orange merged so that they could provide seamless roaming. Fortunately,
the EU, like the FTC in the AOL/Time Warner case, used sunsets so as to
limit the harm from an unnecessary remedy. Nonetheless, a merger review
regime better calibrated to avoid or limit the imposition of such remedies
would clearly improve the poor record of antitrust authorities in imposing
regulatory-type remedies.
IV. TOWARD A NEW STRATEGY FOR MERGER REMEDIES
The current U.S. approach to merger remedies is in a state of creative
ferment. As former FTC Chairman Muris acknowledged, the antitrust
"enforcement agencies must become more sophisticated in their analysis of
alternative remedies. ' 1t°° Unfortunately, the selection of remedies is not
only a matter of more sophistication, but also consistency, transparency,
and adherence to rule of law values (i.e., following or explaining departure
from precedent). In theory, courts might have applied and interpreted the
Tunney Act, 01 which requires judicial review of DOJ consent decrees, to
require a level of consistency and transparency. In practice, however, the
through merger. In a market economy, profit opportunities play a key role in
directing innovative activity and investment. Public policy should not be
concerned about supernormal profits being made by the innovator for a transitory
period.
Bill Bishop & Cristina Caffarra, Merger Control in New Markets, 22(1) EuR. COMPETrTON
L. REv. 31, 31 (2001) (U.K.); see also Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Rhetoric and
Reality in the Merger Standards of the United States, Canada, and the European Union, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 458 (2005) ("Despite the apparent embrace of the consumer surplus
standard, several instances of European merger enforcement in the past fourteen years have
treated efficiencies as negative factors because of their potential for damage to
competitors.").
99. See, MERGER REMEDIES STUDy, supra note 69, at 115.
100. Timothy J. Muris, Improving the Economic Foundations of Competition Policy, 12
GEO. MASON L. REv. 1, 23 (2003).
101. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (Tunney Act), Pub.L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat.
1706 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(d) (2000)).
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DOJ does not explain its choice of remedies in its competitive impact
statements and courts defer greatly to the DOJ's decision to settle rather
than challenge an antitrust case.102 This leaves matters, both at the DOJ and
the FTC, in the unfortunate situation of following a set of procedures and
practices "developed in an era when administrative or judicial litigation
was the expected end result of an investigation," leading to "too much of a
litigator's hide-and-seek approach.',
10 3
Unlike the issues related to substantive merger analysis, the lack of
transparency on the theory of remedies as well as the extraordinarily rare
judicial oversight of remedies leaves the issue of remedies as one where the
antitrust agencies possess considerable discretion. The discretion has led
some observers to bemoan the departure from a "law enforcement" model
in favor of a more regulatory one where "antitrust counselors find
themselves focusing, not just on whether conduct contemplated by their
clients is illegal," but on what antitrust officials think and are likely to seek
in the nature of remedies.' 4 The consequences of this transition are
significant, as "[a]ntitrust, which has always been subject to political
pressure, loses its voice as a law enacted by Congress and becomes just one
more policy to be applied or not, depending on the overall economic and
political policies of a particular administration."' ' Put differently, "the
102. The classic case emphasizing the DOJ's discretion under the Tunney Act, which
only calls for a review of whether the proposed consent decree is in the "public interest," 15
U.S.C. § 16(e) (2000), is United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In
that case, the D.C. Circuit concluded that courts enjoyed a circumscribed mandate under the
Act and emphasized that "[tjhe court's authority to review the decree depends entirely on
the government's exercising its prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in the first
place." Id. at 1459-60. In so doing, it rejected the broader mandate suggested by Judge
Sporkin, who insisted that "Tunney Act courts are not mushrooms to be placed in a dark
comer and sprinkled with fertilizer." United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 333
(D.D.C. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). See also John J. Flynn & Darren Bush, The
Misuse and Abuse of the Tunney Act: The Adverse Consequences of the "Microsoft
Fallacies, " 34 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 749 (2003) (criticizing the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of
the Tunney Act).
103. William J. Kolasky & James W. Lowe, The Merger Review Process at the Federal
Trade Commission: Administrative Efficiency and the Rule of Law, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 889,
894 (1997).
104. Melamed, supra note 34, at 14. Or, as Harry First explained, "particularly with
respect to mergers, the [DOJ] more closely resembles a regulatory agency, with
administrative 'rules' and processes that seldom involve litigation." Harry First, Is Antitrust
"Law"?, 10 ANTITRUST 9, 10 (1995) (citing Thomas Kauper, The Department of Justice and
the Antitrust Laws: Law Enforcer or Regulator?, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 83, 105 (1990)).
105. First, supra note 104, at 11; see also Robert Pitofsky, The Nature and Limits of
Restructuring in Merger Review, Remarks at the Cutting Edge Antitrust Conference (Feb.
17, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/restruct.htm ("I believe that the bipartisan
consensus that strongly supports vigorous antitrust enforcement in this country depends in
no small part on the view that agency enforcement decisions ultimately will be reviewed by
an independent judiciary.").
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pattern of enforcement actions has a mutable quality that is largely
dependent on the whims of the individuals who hold office at a given
moment."
106
The relative lack of transparency and standards at the antitrust
agencies on the matter of merger remedies pales next to the process often
used by the FCC. As the AOL/Time Warner merger review illustrates, the
agency often will use merger reviews as an opportunity to address industry-
wide issues by extracting voluntary conditions. At the same time, there are
instances, such as the News Corp./DirecTV merger, where the FCC's
merger review authority facilitates an antitrust agency's review of the
transaction. Moreover, there are occasions, such as the FTC's review of the
AOL/Time Warner transaction, where antitrust review encroaches on
regulatory policy. In short, the challenge of reforming merger remedies for
regulated industries is both to develop a more effective framework for the
antitrust agencies and to cabin and integrate the role of regulatory agencies
within that framework.
A. Reforming Antitrust Remedies
As of this writing, I have not developed a comprehensive strategy for
cabining and structuring antitrust merger remedies. I am confident,
however, that the current state of affairs, where "the fashioning of merger
remedies is subject to standards that that are not well-defined or
consistent,"' 7 is unhealthy and unsustainable. Ultimately, Congress or the
agencies will need to develop a more effective substantive and procedural
framework for developing merger remedies. In so doing, however, it is
important that they act prudently and avoid unintended consequences, such
as further slowing down merger review, overly proceduralizing the
selection of merger remedies, or creating opportunities for competitors to
use the process of remedy selection for their strategic advantage.
On the question of substantive standards, I acknowledge that any
system designed to provide more structure as to the selection of merger
remedies will need to allow for some flexibility to adapt to different
circumstances. Such flexibility can be accommodated, for example, by
using a set of presumptions that, whenever not followed, would be
explained by the antitrust agency.10 8 By emphasizing the need to justify
departures from the relevant presumptions, a structured framework would
106. William Blumenthal, Reconciling the Debate over Merger Remedies: A
Discussant's Proposed Decision Rule, 69 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 978, 987 (2001).
107. Id. at 978.
108. See id. at 995.
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shed light on the realities behind the often diverging practices of the two
federal antitrust agencies as well as between seemingly similar cases.' 9
On the procedural front, there is a need for more transparency both
during the process and after the fact to provide greater guidance to parties
in future cases. At present, the discussions of appropriate remedies occur
informally and, as a result, only those with highly effective counsel are able
to take part in them. Moreover, these discussions occur in an environment
influenced by previous less-than-transparent negotiations and parties often
have a difficult time invoking any form of precedent (thereby undermining
the ability to plan effectively regarding the scope of likely remedies)." 0
Finally, as to the antitrust agencies' policy of carefully scrutinizing
certain types of divestitures (i.e., ones of less than a going concern), there
are no procedural commitments or checks on them to ensure that they do so
effectively."' Despite such concerns, commentators have barely begun to
consider what type of a structured framework could achieve these goals." 2
Unfortunately, I do not have much to offer to advance this discussion, but it
is clear that recent steps (like the issued guidelines) are positive
developments and that further ones-such as discussing remedial
considerations in competitive impact statements-would continue to
improve the process of designing, selecting, and implementing effective
merger remedies.
109. With the actual reasons for different approaches unrevealed, commentators and
officials often conjecture-veiled by unrevealed facts (sometimes to protect
confidentiality)-as to why the agencies acted in a particular manner. Compare Deborah
Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Looking Forward: Merger and Other Policy
Initiatives at the FTC, at 10 (Nov. 18, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/majoras/041118abafallforum.pdf) ("[D]ifferences among industries may be the
primary explanation for any variation in approach to remedy crafting, be it 'fix-it-first,' 'up
front buyer,' the use of monitors, and the inclusion of crown jewel provisions.") and U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STUDY NEEDED TO ASSESS THE EFFECTS OF RECENT
DIVESTITURES ON COMPETITION IN RETAIL MARKETS 13 (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02793.pdf (reporting on FTC Staff explanation that
"because FTC's decisions are largely tied to companies' trade secret information, which
FTC is statutorily prevented from disclosing to the public, FTC can provide to the public
only limited information on the basis for its decisions") with Albert A. Foer, Toward
Guidelines For Merger Remedies, 52 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 211, 218 (2001) ("Agency
desires to retain maximum discretion, to minimize creation of 'precedents' that can be
invoked by merging parties in subsequent cases, and to avoid acknowledgment of
weaknesses in investigative conclusions" help explain the resistance to explaining the
rationale behind remedial decisions.).
110. See Sims & Mcfalls, supra note 30, at 942.
111. See POLICY GUIDE, supra note 10, at 13 (noting that the DOJ "should scrutinize
carefully" such mergers and that "the [DOJ] must be persuaded that [non-integrated] assets
will create a viable entity that will restore competition").
112. A notable exception is Albert A. Foer, supra note 109.
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B. The Role of Regulatory Agencies in Merger Review
In theory, the existing system-involving both antitrust and
regulatory review-integrates the abilities of the antitrust agencies and the
FCC. As Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce McDonald related in
his testimony to the Antitrust Modernization Commission, shared authority
"allows us better to share our respective expertise-the [Antitrust] Division
with competition issues and the FCC with the regulatory framework and
technical knowledge of the telecommunications industry as a whole.""' 3 In
the News Corp./DirecTV case, the two agencies worked together to resolve
the competition policy concerns in a manner that enabled the DOJ to clear
the merger with confidence that the FCC would superintend an access
regime necessary to facilitate competition in the post-merger environment.
Nonetheless, the level of formal cooperation and the harmonized result in
that case are the exceptions, with cases like AOL/Time Warner
representing the rule.
The gap between the theory and practice of antitrust and regulatory
merger review begs the question of whether harmonization is truly
warranted or the current system should remain intact. Significantly, there
are two notable disadvantages inherent in any system that relies on
regulatory action: a lack of enforcement credibility and a lack of a
secondary system of oversight. As to both issues, and for other reasons, it
makes sense to empower the regulators to act effectively rather than to
eviscerate their role. Consequently, I conclude that the lack of
harmonization in merger review is not an effective long-term strategy, but
instead is a quirk of the U.S. system that should be reformed.
In considering the value of continued reliance on regulatory agencies
to effectuate antitrust merger review goals, it is important to consider
whether the regulatory agencies possess the necessary competence and
power to enforce efficacious conduct remedies. Historically speaking, the
FCC has not developed a culture of enforcement and, for both legal and
institutional reasons, regulated parties sometimes adopted an attitude of
"ask forgiveness, not permission." On the legal front, the limitations on the
FCC's fining authority are such that former Chairman Powell commented
that legislative reform raising the applicable limits is warranted so that FCC
imposed obligations are "something [that] carriers take seriously, and not
merely a cost of doing business."
' 14
113. Bruce McDonald, Dep't of Justice, Testimony to the Antitrust Modernization
Comm'n 7 (Dec. 5, 2005).
114. Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, Competition Issues in the Telecommunications
Industry Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 12 (Jan.
14, 2003) (statement available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-
230241Al.pdf).
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The FCC's limited effectiveness as an enforcement agency actually
provides a rationale for elevating its importance in enforcing conduct
remedies imposed as part of merger reviews between regulated firms. Apart
from merger review issues, the FCC's future role in managing competition
policy should be one guided by antitrust principles-as is already the case
in the European Unionl-and characterized by fewer rules that are
enforced very effectively.' 16 This mission, however, requires the
institutional competence necessary to enforce merger remedies, meaning
that a commitment to enforcing merger remedies will go hand-in-hand with
regulatory reform goals.
Even assuming the FCC's competence to enforce merger remedies,
there is a still an independent concern about placing all of the enforcement
eggs in one basket. Stated differently, even if a regulatory agency is an
effective enforcer, there is an arguable value to having "two cops on the
beat." The danger, however, is that a double enforcement strategy will be
contradictory, duplicative, or, at best, a poor use of social resources. To be
sure, if the regulatory body is consistently off-base or ineffectual, an
enhanced role for antitrust-as in the AT&T consent decree-is potentially
justifiable. But the best of all worlds is one where the regulatory body
maintains all oversight of conduct remedies and thus is able to harmonize
and enforce them consistently with the general regulatory regime. 1
7
The irony of the persistence of antitrust-imposed conduct remedies-
such as the Primestar case and the AOL/Time Warner merger-is that they
ignore some of the lessons of the AT&T consent decree. As I have argued
elsewhere, the critical lesson is not that antitrust agencies should not
impose such remedies, but that they should enable competent regulatory
agencies to superintend the remedies in question (and harmonize them with
115. In principle, the EU approach enables "the reconciliation of sector regulation with
competition law in which the application of ex ante regulation should become redundant as
'effective competition' develops." Ian Dobbs & Paul Richards, Innovation and the New
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications in the EU, 25(11) EUR.
COMPETTON L. REv. 716, 716 (2004). In practice, however, some have criticized it as a
disappointment because national regulatory authorities exercising authority under its
framework are "inclined to regulate on a 'just in case' basis and so perpetuate regulation
under the 'original sin' hypothesis of the previous regime." Id.
116. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 16, at 429, 458; Philip J. Weiser, Toward
a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 41, 65-84 (2003).
117. As Martin Cave and Peter Crowther noted, "[t]he second best [option]-'regulatory
anti-trust'--carries the danger of over-regulation, and poor enforcement by an
inexperienced and (possibly) inexpert body. Such intentions may be preferable to the
alternative of doing nothing, but the sooner the situation is regularised by regulation the
better." Martin Cave & Peter Crowther, Pre-emptive Competition Policy Meets Regulatory
Anti-trust, 26(9) EuR. CoMPETmoN L. REv. 481,490 (2005).
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the relevant regulatory regime).' 8 In the monopolization context, Professor
Areeda recognized that regulatory agencies changed the antitrust equation,
explaining that forced sharing "[r]emedies may be practical" in instances
where "a regulatory agency [] exists to control the terms of dealing."' 1 9
Notably, the Supreme Court has employed such a strategy even where
regulatory agencies existed to oversee the terms of dealings, but were not
previously doing so.' 20 By following such a strategy, antitrust agencies can
take advantage of their comparative competence over regulatory agencies
while minimizing or avoiding the pitfalls cautioned against by Professor
Areeda.1
21
In terms of consent decrees that call for continuing oversight or
limitations in industries subject to regulatory oversight, there is a powerful
rationale for institutionalizing greater regulatory involvement in such cases.
Take, for example, the DOJ's consent decree that limited the ability of
Nextel to purchase additional licenses that could be used for the so-called
"specialized mobile radio" (SMR) services. 22 In that case, the DOJ defined
the market as one for "dispatch services," particularly those provided using
spectrum in the 800 and 900 MHz bands, and concluded that cellular
telephone service was not a reasonable substitute.
23
From the outset, the DOJ's review of Nextel's merger activity placed
it in a regulatory role for which the FCC was better suited. First, in
permitting the merger, the DOJ suggested that it allowed more
consolidation than it would otherwise because it recognized that "Nextel's
consolidation of SMR spectrum [could] enable it to create a third mobile
telephone service.' 124 Second, the DOJ expected that technological,
business, and regulatory forces would remain relatively constant over the
decade during which the decree was in effect. In particular, the DOJ's
analysis envisioned that spectrum licenses would be restricted to certain
uses and that a viable stand-alone dispatch market would continue in the
wake of wireless technological advances. The DOJ was wrong on both
scores. In the wake of the collapse of the standalone commercial dispatch
market, the emergence of a thriving cellular market as well as an FCC
118. See Philip J. Weiser, Goldwasser, The Telecom Act, and Reflections on Antitrust
Remedies, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. 1 (2003); Philip J. Weiser, The Relationship of Antitrust and
Regulation in A Deregulatory Era, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 549 (2005).
119. Areeda, supra note 49, at 853.
120. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
121. For a more developed discussion of this point, see Weiser, Antitrust Remedies,
supra note 118, at 16-18.
122. United States v. Motorola, Inc., No. CIV. A. 94-2331, 1995 WL 866794 (D.D.C.
July 25, 1995).
123. Id. at *8.
124. Id. at *11.
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commitment to promote flexible uses of spectrum through a secondary
markets initiative, 125 Nextel requested a waiver from the consent decree
restrictions. After initially resisting the request,126 the DOJ agreed to loosen
its restrictions and terminate it altogether one year later.'
27
Even to the extent that the antitrust agencies develop competence or
hire a highly qualified special monitor (as the FTC did in the AOL/Time
Warner case), the agencies will always lack the economies of scope and
scale enjoyed by the regulatory body. In the case of the Verizon/MCI and
SBC/AT&T mergers, for example, the FCC is currently overseeing access
arrangements of a similar kind (to local loops and transport) and is thus
well-positioned to enforce the relevant IRU divestiture requirement.
Moreover, in cases like Primestar, the rationale for FCC enforcement is
even greater, as the DOJ's effort to craft and enforce shadow program
access rules was suspect from the outset.
Finally, whether or not the regulatory agencies possess greater
expertise and resources, it is also clear that they benefit from the dynamics
of repeat games. In the case of the DOJ, it is quite possible that the
Verizon/MCI and SBC/AT&T merger commitments will haunt them later
if not taken seriously-as indeed some suggested was the case for MCI
WorldCom after the failed InternetMCI divestiture. It is an absolute
certainty, however, that those firms will face repeated interactions with the
FCC, meaning that front-end measures like crown jewel provisions are
unnecessary where the agency must preserve its good will and credibility or
face repercussions.
C. Toward New Practices for Merger Review and a New
Institutional Regime
The current state of merger review and merger remedies in the
telecommunications industry is a second-best world where antitrust
authorities encroach on the turf of the regulatory authorities and vice versa.
The antitrust agencies may adopt this posture either because of a hesitancy
to cede authority to a regulatory agency because of concerns that the
125. See Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the
Development of Secondary Markets, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 20604 (2003) (establishing secondary markets in spectrum);
Memorandum of the United States In Opposition To Nextel's Motion To Vacate The 1995
Consent Decree at 9-10, United States v. Motorola, Inc., No. CIV. A. 94-2331 (TFH)
(D.D.C. Feb. 29, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2200/2288.htin
(acknowledging lack of competition in the dispatch market) [hereinafter Nextel
Memorandum].
126. See Nextel Memorandum, supra note 125.
127. Response of the United States to Public Comments on the Proposed Modified
Consent Decree, United States v. Motorola, Inc., No. CIV. A. 94-2331 (TFH) (D.D.C. Aug.
26, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f3600/3676.htm.
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regulators will get it wrong (or lack the competence to enforce conduct
remedies effectively), or, most likely, because they have not developed
consistent and structured practices on merger remedies more generally. The
regulatory authorities (the FCC and, in some cases, state public utility
commissions) are reluctant to cede authority to the antitrust agencies and
thus engage in duplicative competition policy analysis as well as impose
remedies above and beyond those called for by the antitrust agencies.
To the extent that the antitrust efforts by regulatory authorities and the
regulatory efforts of the antitrust agencies compensate for the failings of
the other, there is some value in this system. Nonetheless, this value is a
clear second-best to a more rationally designed system that allocates
authority and channels the competition policy analysis more efficiently and
effectively. This section outlines some tentative suggestions for a new
structure for a merger review system that would accomplish this goal.
In the HSR Act era, the antitrust agencies have developed remedies in
a remarkably informal manner with little analysis of their relative
effectiveness. To some degree, the agencies have developed certain
norms-including the preference for divestitures of stand-alone
operations--but the selections of merger remedies remain relatively opaque
and under-analyzed. Relatedly, there are still few guideposts to structure
the analysis of what remedies are appropriate and whether they are
enforced effectively.
This era of informality has produced some successes and benefits.
Viewed charitably, one might conclude that the antitrust agencies have
moved away from the regulatory efforts of Primestar, TCI!Liberty, and
AOL/Time Warner and toward the path taken in News Corp./DirecTV.
Significantly, the DOJ explained its lack of action in News Corp./DirecTV
and expressly deferred to the FCC's enforcement regime. Unlike the EU
system, the antitrust authorities in the United States do not generally
explain a lack of action, although that has started to change.
In crafting a more formalized system for developing merger remedies,
the antitrust authorities should commit to a system whereby all appropriate
conduct remedies are developed through formal consultation with and by
lodging ultimate enforcement authority with the appropriate regulatory
agency. By so doing, the antitrust agencies could avoid becoming shadow
regulators and, at the same time, empower the regulatory agencies to
harmonize merger remedies with industry regulation. In particular, any
merger remedy calling for a conduct remedy should be subject to an FCC
veto on the ground that it is redundant with respect to current regulation or
otherwise unnecessary. In the cases of Primestar, TCIILiberty, and
AOL/Time Warner, for example, there is a reasonably good chance that the
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imposed remedies would have failed this test and not have been imposed
(or at least would have been lifted more quickly than they were).
A central challenge for regulatory agencies such as the FCC is to
defer to the competition policy analysis of the DOJ as well as its choice of
merger remedies. On balance, the agency's duplicative analysis has yielded
few benefits while it has delayed merger approvals and imposed significant
administrative costs. Moreover, because the imposition of "voluntary
conditions" provides an inviting (but less deliberative) alternative than
industry-wide rulemaking or formal adjudications, a cessation of that
practice would encourage the FCC to rely on such procedures to address
industry-wide issues like the instant messaging interoperability issue
addressed in the AOL/Time Warner merger.
In insisting on a high level of deference to the antitrust authorities, I
do believe that the FCC can provide some added value in merger review. In
particular, not only do I see the agency as crucial in evaluating the wisdom
of conduct remedies, I also believe that it should be able to evaluate
competition policy harms related to the merger and to suggest solutions. As
a prerequisite to imposing any conditions on a merger, however, the FCC
should be required to justify them as truly necessary to address a
competitive concern raised by the merger-as opposed to resolving an
industry-wide question. Moreover, before any FCC-proposed solutions
could go into effect, they would be subject to a veto by the antitrust agency
charged with reviewing the merger. Finally, these remedies-whether
termed voluntary or not--should be subject to judicial review to ensure that
they are truly necessary to address a competitive issue raised by the merger
and to ensure consistency in the use of regulatory merger remedies.
V. CONCLUSION
The current U.S. system for reviewing mergers in the
telecommunications industry and imposing appropriate remedies reflects a
series of independent decisions and unintended consequences. For a system
not designed in a careful and coherent manner, the U.S. model of merger
remedies-despite its high degree of informality, periodic inconsistency,
and questionable allocation of authority-works reasonably well.
Nonetheless, this second-best model is structurally flawed and in need of
reform. To date, no opportunity or notable failure has driven a systematic
reform of the system and addressed the concerns outlined herein.
Consequently, this area is ripe for reform and deserves serious
reexamination.
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